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An Analysis of INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner
On February 26, 1992 the Supreme Court of the United States decided
what may one day prove to be the most often cited tax case, INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner.1 The main issue involved a dispute between INDOPCO and the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") concerning the
deductibility of banking and legal fees incurred with respect to a friendly
takeover. 2 Due to the broad language used by Justice Blackmun, the case has
the potential3 to cause much controversy 4 and litigation in areas that most
thought to be closed chapters in the story of current deductibility of trade or
business expenses under section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
("Code"). 5
This Comment first examines cases leading up to, and which may have
been overruled by, INDOPCO.6 The Comment then outlines the facts of
INDOPCO as well as its procedural and substantive holdings. Next, the
Comment discusses the separate and distinct asset test, which INDOPCO
correctly rejected. The Comment then discusses the future benefits holding of
INDOPCO and its possible impact outside the friendly takeover arena. After
discussing the possible impact of INDOPCO, the Comment discusses the
proper test to apply when determining whether an expenditure should be
currently deducted under section 162 or capitalized under section 263. In this
respect, this Comment argues that courts should base their decisions on a
distortion of income theory, while giving consideration to practical concerns.
Finally, the Comment ends with recommendations as to how the Service should
handle deductibility of certain expenses in the future.
1 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). INDOPCO, Inc. was formerly known as National Starch and
Chemical Corp. ("National Starch").2 1d.
3 See Timothy J. McCormally, TEl Warns of IRS Agents Poised to Disallow
Historically Deductible Expenditures, 55 TAx NoTEs 739, 739 (1992).
4 Recent controversy has developed concerning the deductibility of expenses incurred
in removing asbestos. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
5 Some of these expenses include: advertising, employee training, repairs, and
expansion costs.
All section references contained herein are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, title
26 of the U.S. Code, unless otherwise indicated.
6 Some commentators argue that, due to the language used in INDOPCO and the facts
of some of the previous cases, INDOPCO can possibly be distinguished. See, e.g., George
B. Jarvas & Todd F. Maynes, Business Expansion and Protection in the Post INDOPCO
World, 55 TAX NOTEs 971, 972-79 (1992).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
I. THE INTERPRETATION OF CoMMIssIoNER V. LINCOLN SAVINGS &
LoANAss'Nv
According to some, prior to Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan
Ass'n7 the law regarding the tax treatment of an expenditure was "in a state of
hopeless confusion." 8 Courts had developed two tests to determine whether a
taxpayer could currently deduct an expense. 9 Some courts made the
determination according to whether the expenditure "result[ed] in the
taxpayer's acquisition or retention of a capital asset."' 0 Other courts made the
determination based on whether the expenditure resulted in "business benefit[s
that would be] . . .reaped . . .beyond a single year."" An affirmative
response to either of these tests denied current deductibility and required
capitalization of the expenditure.
Lincoln Savings involved a dispute over the deductibility of an "additional
premium" paid to the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC"). The additional premium related to an increase in Lincoln Savings
& Loan Association's ("Lincoln") accounts that the FSLIC insured. 12 The
payment was required in order to maintain the Secondary Reserve for the
FSLIC's insurance obligations. 13 Lincoln carried its interest in the Secondary
Reserve as an asset on its balance sheet. 14 In denying a deduction for the
payment as an ordinary business expense, the Supreme Court stated:
[Ihe presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not
controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect
beyond the taxable year ....
7 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
8 Brief for Petitioner at 14, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992)
(No. 90-1278), rdcrojbnned on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs (Microform, Inc.),
(quoting BriarcliffCandy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973)).
9 Id. at 15.
10 ld. (quoting Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 507,
515 (1946), aftd, 161 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1947)).
11Id. (quoting Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 393
F.2d 494, 496 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968)).
12 Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 345 (1971). The state-
chartered savings and loan was compelled to make the payment pursuant to § 404(d) of the
National Housing Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (1989). The payments resembled
prepayments for insurance. Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 345.13 Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 348-51.
14 Id. at 351. The Court determined that Lincoln's interest in the Secondary Reserve
was in fact an asset. Id. at 355.
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What is important and controlling, we feel, is that the [expenditure] serves
to create... a separate and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable
consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not ... deductible under
§ 162(a) .... Is
Regardless of whether the Lincoln Savings Court so intended, courts and
commentators interpreted this language to require the creation of a separate and
distinct asset in order to deny current deductibility. 16 Accordingly, in Briarcliff
Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,17 the Second Circuit adopted the separate and
distinct asset test.' 8 Briarcliiff Candy involved a dispute over the deductibility of
expenses incurred in an intense campaign to entice retailers to become franchise
sellers of the taxpayer's candy. 19 The Commissioner denied deductibility of
much of the expenses on the ground that the taxpayer incurred the expenditures
to acquire "capital assets 'consisting of... valuable franchise contracts."' 20
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit disagreed, holding that the expenditure
did not create a separate and distinct asset.21 Consequently, under the
impression that Lincoln Savings created a separate and distinct asset test, the
expenditures were currently deductible under section 162(a). 22
The Fourth Circuit followed Briarcliff Candy's interpretation of Lincoln
Savings in NCNB Corp. v. United States.23 As a result, because no separate
and distinct asset was created, the Fourth Circuit permitted a current deduction
for expenses incurred by a bank in developing and operating a system of
branch banking facilities. 24 Because the Second and Fourth Circuits'
interpretations of Lincoln Savings conflicted with that of the Third Circuit in
the case at hand, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
15 Id. at 354.
16 Brief for Petitioner at 11, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039
(1992) (No. 90-1278), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs
(Microform, Inc.). "Since the Lincoln Savings decision in 1971, the court of appeals for six
circuits--the second, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, and tenth-have followed the 'separate and
distinct asset' test." Id.
17 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).181Id.
19 Id. at 777-78.
20 Id. at 780.
2 1 Id. at 786. The franchisees agreed only to use their best efforts to sell the candy.
The franchisees did not agree not to sell other manufacturers' candy, and they did not
guarantee any minimum amount of sales. Id.
22 Id. at 786-87.
23 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982).24 Id. at 289-90.
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II. INDOPCO, INC. V. CoMMIsSIONER
INDOPCO, Inc. (previously National Starch and Chemical Corp.) is a
Delaware corporation that manufactures and sells adhesives, starches, and
chemical products.25 In late 1977, one of National Starch's customers,
Unilever United States, Inc. ("Unilever"), expressed an interest to National
Starch about the possibility of a friendly takeover.26 Frank and Anna
Greenwall were National Starch's largest shareholders. The Greenwalls owned
approximately fourteen and one half percent of the corporation's six and one
half million outstanding shares.27 Concerned about their income tax planning,
the Greenwalls indicated that they would cooperate with the takeover only if a
tax-free transfer were possible.28
With the use of two newly created subsidiaries, lawyers representing both
sides devised a "reverse subsidiary cash merger" that satisfied the Greenwalls'
request for a tax-free exchange under section 351 of the Code.29 Unilever
owned one of the subsidiaries, National Starch and Chemical Holding
Corporation ("Holding"), which in turn owned the other subsidiary, NSC
Merger, Inc. ("NSC"). Pursuant to the merger agreement, Holding exchanged
one share of its nonvoting preferred stock for one share of National Starch
common stock. Any of National Starch common stock not tendered to Holding
was converted into cash by merging NSC into National Starch.30
In order for National Starch's board of directors to fulfill its fiduciary duty
to National Starch's shareholders, National Starch employed the investment
banking firm of Morgan Stanley to render a fairness opinion concerning the
takeover. Morgan Stanley charged National Starch $2,225,586 for these
services. 31 Additionally, National Starch's legal counsel, Debevoise, Plimpton,
25 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1041 (1992).
26 Id.
27 Id.
2 8 Id.
2 9 Id. Section 351(a) provides that "[nlo gain or loss shall be recognized if property is
transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock in such
corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control...
of the corporation." I.R.C. § 351(a) (1988).
3 0 ANDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1041. National Starch's common shareholders exchanged
approximately 21% of their shares for Holding preferred stock. The other 79 % was
exchanged for cash. Id. at 1041 n.2. The Court further based its holding on the assumption
that the takeover resulted in a reorganization. This conclusion has been criticized by
commentators. This Comment does not address the issue of whether the takeover constituted
a reorganization.
31 Id. at 1042. The fees were $2,200,000 for banking, $7,586 for out-of-pocket
expenses, and $18,000 for legal fees. Id.
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Lyons & Gater, charged National Starch $505,069 for its work in
consummating the takeover.32 The deductibility of these banking and legal fees
under section 162(a) was the subject of controversy in INDOPCO.
The Tax Court held that these expenditures were capital in nature.
Consequently, National Starch could not deduct the fees under section 162(a) as
ordinary and necessary business expenses on its 1978 income tax return. The
Tax Court based its decision primarily on a conclusion that National Starch
would receive long-term benefits from its acquisition by Unilever.33 The Tax
Court specifically held that Lincoln Savings was inapplicable because in Lincoln
Savings the Supreme Court did not address the issue of deductibility when the
expenses did not create a separate and distinct asset. 34 On appeal, the Third
Circuit rejected National Starch's argument that Lincoln Savings created a
separate and distinct asset requirement for capitalization and affirmed the Tax
Court's holding that the fees were nondeductible under section 162(a). 35
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve a perceived conflict"
regarding the application of Lincoln Savings in the circuit courts.3 6 The Court
began by stating that "an income deduction is a matter of legislative grace," 37
and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving an entitlement to any deduction.38
The Court further held that, because deductions are specifically enumerated and
capital deductions are not exhaustively enumerated, 39 when a conflict between
the two arises, deductibility must yield to capitalization. 4° The Court then
stated that:
32 Id. The legal fees paid to Debevoise were originally not deducted by National Starch
under § 162(a). However, after the Commissioner disallowed a current deduction for the
banking fees, National Starch, upon seeking redetermination in the Tax Court, asserted the
right to deduct the $505,069 in legal fees as well. Id.
33 National Starch and Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 67, 75 (1989),
af'd, 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom. ]NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112
S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
34 Id. at77.
35 National Starch and Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 928-31 (3d
Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
36 INDOpCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1042 (emphasis added). Commentators have argued that
perhaps some of the circuit court opinions were not overturned and can be reconciled. They
point to the Court's use of the words "perceived conflict" in support of this argument. See
McCormally, supra note 3.
37 Id. at 1043 (citing Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593
(1943)).
38 Id.
3 9 
ILd.
40 See id.
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Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition that a taxpayer's expenditure
that "serves to create or enhance... a separate and distinct asset" should be
capitalized under § 263. It by no means follows, however, that only
expenditures that create or enhance separate and distinct assets are to be
capitalized under § 263.41
The Court continued to expand its analysis of Lincoln Savings stating that
Lincoln Savings did not "prohibit reliance on [a] future benefit as a means of
distinguishing an ordinary business expense from a capital expenditure." 42 The
Court then stated that realizing benefits beyond the year in which the taxpayer
incurs an expense is "undeniably important in determining whether the
appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization." 43 Holding
that the fees involved were related to significant future benefits, the Court
denied a deduction as an ordinary and necessary business expense and required
capitalization. 44
The Court identified a number of so called "future benefits" that would be
generated as a result of the takeover. One of the benefits the Court identified
was that the availability of Unilever's resources would broaden the
corporation's opportunities. 45 The Court also recognized the possibility of
synergy between National Starch and Unilever given the nature of the two
companies' operations.4 Furthermore, in upholding the Tax Court's decision,
the Court implicitly held that the takeover resulted in a long-term benefit,
because otherwise, given their fiduciary duties, the board of directors would
not have approved the transaction. 47
As Richard M. Lipton indicates in an article discussing INDOPCO and its
possible consequences, "[a]lthough the [INDOPCO] Court's analysis of Lincoln
Savings rebutted the oft-cited proposition by optimistic taxpayers that the
absence of a separate asset permits deductibility, the [case] did not answer the
more significant question of whether capitalization always follows the existence
41 Id. at 1044. Justice Blackmun continued, "In short, Lincoln Savings holds that the
creation of a separate and distinct asset well may be a sufficient but not a necessary
condition to classification as a capital expenditure." Id. (citing General Bancshares Corp. v.
Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964)).
42Id.
43 Id. at 1045 (citing United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310
(1972) and Central Tex. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
44 1d.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See id
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of a long-term benefit." 48 Due to the extremely broad language used in
INDOPCO, expenses that have historically been deductible are now in jeopardy
of being attacked by the Service as capital expenditures. 49
Indeed, by June of 1991 IRS agents had already begun citing the Third
Circuit opinion (National Starch and Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner)Sas
authority for "disallowing deductions for expenses totally independent of any
corporate restructuring or acquisition." 51 Taken to its logical extreme, any
corporate expense produces a long-term benefit and therefore must be
capitalized. In support of this conclusion, one must note that directors and
officers owe a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders to
incur only those expenses that are in the best interest of the corporation. 52 The
mere fact of future benefit, however, as this Comment attempts to explain,
should not be the sole determining factor as to whether an expense is
capitalized versus expensed.
III. THE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ASSET TEST
The determination of whether an expense is a capital expenditure or a
current business expense depends on the particular facts involved and the
"relation of the payment to the type of business in which the taxpayer is
engaged." 53 Some industries treat certain expenses differently than other
industries. One taxpayer may capitalize an expenditure that another taxpayer in
a different industry expenses in the current taxable year. 54 As the Supreme
Court has noted, "the 'decisive distinctions' between current expenses and
capital expenditures 'are those of degree and not of kind.' 55
When considering the tax treatment of an expenditure based on a theory of
distortion of income, it becomes apparent that the separate and distinct asset
test is incorrect. The Lincoln Savings reference to the separate and distinct asset
48 Richard M. Upton et al., Supreme Court Approves Focus on Long-Term Benefit in
Takeover Expense Controversy, 76 J. TAX'N 324, 326 (1992).
49 MeCormally, supra note 3, at 739.
50 918 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd sub nom., INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992).
5 1 Brief of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. as amicus curiae in support of Petitioner at
n.10 and accompanying text, ]NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992)
(No. 90-1278) [hereinafter Brief of Tax Execuives].
52 Upton et al., supra note 48, at 327.
53 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, Callaghan, § 25.37 at 116.
5 4 Id.
55 ]NDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (1992) (citing Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933)).
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as the controlling factor, and its rejection of the future benefit as the controlling
factor, led many courts to the incorrect result of current deductibility where no
separate and distinct asset could be found.56 As previously stated, Briarcliff
Candy interpreted Lincoln Savings as creating a "shift in emphasis" from
whether the benefit extended well into future taxable years to whether the
taxpayer acquired a separate and distinct asset.57 When the Second Circuit
failed to find a separate and distinct asset from the expenses incurred in
obtaining the franchise agreements, the court permitted a current deduction
under section 162(a). 58
By taking a current deduction when the taxpayer derives significant future
benefits from the expenditure, the taxpayer distorts its current and future
income. Current income is too low and future income is too high. This is not a
true reflection of income. Where it is administratively practical, the taxpayer
should match the expenditure with the income it produces. That an expenditure
does not create a separate and distinct asset in no way means that the
expenditure necessarily produces income in the same taxable year in which the
taxpayer incurred the expense. By allowing such a deduction, the separate and
distinct asset test assesses taxes according to the taxpayer's net worth after the
expenditure is made.5 9 Such a rule has been criticized as merely leading the
Service to develop creative ways in which to label benefits derived from a
56 john W. Lee, Doping Out the Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, 57 TAX NOTES
669, 674 (1992).
57 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
58 BriarcliffCandy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1973).
59 See Charles A. LoFaso, An Argwnent for Current Deductibility of a Target's
Expenses in a "Friendly Takeover," 38 BUFF. L. RnV. 801, 807-08 (1990). LoFaso states:
Thus while the receipt of an item is income if it represents an "accession- to wealth"
(ie., an increase in net worth), an expenditure is deductible if it currently reduces the
taxpayer's net worth. A taxpayer who has exchanged an asset, say cash, for a benefit
which does not extend beyond the taxable year. . . is entitled to a current deduction
against taxable income. The deduction reflects the decrease in the taxpayer's net worth
resulting from the exchange of an asset for a benefit consumed within, and thus
allocable to, the current accounting period. In other words, an asset has been
transformed into an expense of current operations.
Conversely, when one asset, cash, is exchanged for another asset having utility
beyond the current accounting period, net worth is not affected by the expenditure.
[If] the expenditures... did not enhance the value of the asset being acquired[]
[then taxation based on net worth requires current deductibility].
Id. at 807-11 (footnotes omitted).
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taxpayer's expenses as an asset. 60 Additionally, there are many other instances
in which a separate and distinct asset has arguably not been created, yet the
Code requires capitalization. Some of these instances include start-up costs of a
new business, certain minimum educational requirement expenses, and
expenses related to finding a new job in a different occupational field.61
The separate and distinct asset test works fine when applied to the
acquisition of tangible assets. However, when mechanically extended to all
expenditures in the form of a definitive test, "the doctrine .. produces [a]
distortion of income . . [as well as] conceptual distortions and inevitable
conflicts in line-drawing" as to whether or not a separate and distinct asset has
been acquired. 62
IV. THE "FuTuRE BENEFIT" HOLDING OF INDOPCO, INC. V.
COMMISSIONER AND ITS POSSIBLE REACH
To the extent that INDOPCO laid to rest the separate and distinct asset test,
the case is correct and the Supreme Court should be commended. However, to
the extent that it created a new test requiring capitalization whenever an
expenditure produces future benefits, INDOPCO is misguided. In many cases
such a rule will result in no clearer a reflection of income than the separate and
distinct asset test. The only difference is that the distortion of income will be in
the opposite direction. 63 Instead of current income being too low and future
income too high, as with the distortion under the separate and distinct asset
test, an automatic requirement of capitalization where a future benefit is found
will cause current and future income to be overstated until the taxable year in
which the benefits from the expenditure cease, and often not until the business
entity itself ceases to exist.64
60 Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an
Asset, 15 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 443, 489 (1974). Professor Gunn argues that the
different tax treatment for acquired goodwill and self-developed goodwill is justified. Id.
61 Lee, sura note 56, at 675.
6 2 Id. at 675-76 (footnote omitted) (citing various cases pointing out the problem).
63 This assumes that capitalization will continue under the Code as it currently exists.
In many situations there will be no way to recover the cost of the capital expenditure. The
author of this Comment disagrees only with indefinite capitalization and agrees that
capitalization with a "proper" recovery would be the correct treatment. However, as this
Comment points out, there are some expenditures that produce future benefit but
nevertheless should be currently expensed even when an amortization period can accurately
be shown.
64 This assumes that the taxpayer cannot recover the expenditure by amortization
under any of the existing Code provisions.
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Many fear that the Service has interpreted INDOPCO to mean that the test
is solely a question of future benefit. For instance, Forbes writer Laura
Saunders states that "the Supreme Court's INDOPCO decision has created
'chaos' ... [and] 'has the tax world up in arms [because of] the absurdly broad
language the Justices used.' The IRS victory has 'meant a license for the
government to disallow all manner of normal business deductions.'" 65
The likelihood that the IRS will apply INDOPCO to other business expense
areas is quite apparent in the Service's recent Technical Advice Memorandum
("TAM") 92-40-004.66 This TAM states that costs for removing asbestos
insulation from manufacturing equipment and replacing it with nonharmful
insulation is a nondeductible capital expenditure. 67 The IRS made this
determination by stating that the expenditures increase the value of the
taxpayer's equipment. The Service indicated that long-term benefits accrued as
a result of the expenditure. The Service pointed to findings that the taxpayer
had a lower liability risk, that the equipment was more marketable because
property without asbestos is more attractive than property with asbestos, and
that there were safer working conditions for employees. 68 In Plainfield-Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner,69 however, the Tax Court held that expenses
associated with replacing tar-lined water pipes with cement-lined pipes were
currently deductible under section 162(a).
In Plainfield-Union, the Tax Court held that "a[n] expenditure which
returns property to the state it was in before the situation prompting the
expenditure arose, and which does not make the relevant property more
valuable, more useful, or longer-lived, is usually deemed a deductible
repair." 70 The Service now attempts to distinguish Plainfield-Union on the
grounds that "the asbestos was not removed because of its ineffectiveness as an
65 Forbes Writer Says INDOPCO Dedsion Has Created Chaos, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY
239-61 (1992).
66 A TAM is a private ruling released by the IRS explaining how the Service intends to
rule on a particular matter. TAM's are not law and § 61100)(3) of the Code prohibits them
from being cited as precedent. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
67 Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992). Interestingly, "[c]orporations that
have been under increasing pressure from... Congress, federal regulators, and the public
to step up their environmental clean-up programs say the guidance in the TAM puts them
between a rock and a hard place." This ruling could possibly have a "chilling effect" on
companies considering spending money on environmental concerns. It seems that this ruling
has "pushed tax policy out of sync with environmental policy." Rita L. Zeidner, INDOPCO
Provides Groundworkfor Denying Deduction, 56 TAx NoTrS 970, 970 (1992).
68 Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992).
69 39 T.C. 333, 341 (1962).
7 0 Eric R. Fox and Michael F. Solomon, IRS Detennines Asbestos Removal in Capital
Expenditure, 77 1. TAx'N 202, 202 (1992) (quoting Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 337).
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insulating material but only to meet regulatory guidelines related to health." 71
The error in this reasoning is that regardless of the purpose for which the
taxpayer made the repairs, the resulting condition in the two situations is the
same. Any increase in value from a situation such as the one in TAM 92-40-
004 was also present in Plainfield-Union. After the taxpayer replaced the water
pipes in Plainfield-Union, its property was also more marketable and valuable.
Plainfield-Union did not find an increase in value as a result of the
expenditure, and the result should be the same when a taxpayer removes
asbestos for safety reasons. However, Plainfield-Union did not address the
question in light of INDOPCO. Therefore, the only plausible reason for the
result in the TAM is based on the intangible future benefits mentioned as a
result of the removal. 72 It is this reliance on the future benefits as the sole
determining factor that has the "tax world up in arms." 73 Furthermore, reliance
on future benefits will lead to as large a distortion of income as did the separate
and distinct asset test.
This distortion will occur in instances such as Briarcliff Candy and Lincoln
Savings because capitalization will now be required without any means by
which to recover these costs in future years. The lack of a statutorily provided
recovery period for this type of expenditure supports this conclusion. By not
creating recovery periods, the Commissioner has argued that the "asset" or
"benefit" representing the taxpayer's expenditure has an indefinite useful life
and therefore cannot be amortized. 74 Courts are reluctant even to permit
amortization of expenditures related to intangible benefits whose utility clearly
declines over the years. 75 Although one cannot easily estimate an amortization
period for future benefit expenses, indefinite capitalization of these
expenditures often results in no clearer reflection of income than current
deductibility. Likewise, this treatment is no more likely to reach the goal of
matching expenses to the taxable period in which the expense produces income
than if the expenses were currently deductible. 76 In fact, commentators argue
that a current deduction in situations such as Briarcliff Candy would result in a
clearer reflection of income.77 For instance, as Professor Gunn has stated:
71 Id.
72Id. at 203.
73 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
7 4 Gunn, supra note 60, at 492.
7 5 Id. at 492 & n.224 (discussing purchased customer lists and advertising campaigns
where the benefit clearly declines over time).
76 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
77 Gun, supra note 60, at 492-93.
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A deduction will at least result in the taxation of only net income, while
capitalization may deny or unduly postpone any tax effect in the case of costs
that should at most be deferred for a relatively short period. The effect of
capitalization will give the costs tax effect only in the year when the business is
sold or terminated; if the costs are rightly thought of as the costs of earning
income in years close to that in which they are incurred, such a postponement
would seem to distort income more than a current deduction would.7 s
V. THE DISTORTION OF INCOME TEST & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDuURES
Section 263(a)(1) denies a deduction for "any amount paid out for new
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate." 79 Courts should not read this statutory
language as a technical requirement for capitalization.80 Too much attention to
the particular words used in the Code may lead one to the wrong result when
determining whether an expenditure should be capitalized. 8' Rather, the critical
factor in determining if an expenditure is capital in nature should be whether
current deductibility causes a distortion of income.
Business expenditures should be given a tax effect that results, as closely as
possible, in the least distortion of income while still considering accounting
costs. Rather than having a single future benefits test determine capitalization,
the Service should permit a taxpayer to evaluate the treatment of an expenditure
in relation to its business and the relative amount of the expenditure to the
business's overall income.82
In the case of some expenditures, such as nonrecurring business expansion
costs, rough estimates for amortization periods should be permitted. This
treatment will result in a more accurate reflection of income than no
amortization at all. A more accurate reflection of income results where, despite
a future benefit, the expenditure is: (1) currently deductible because the
expenditure "is not substantial in relationship to the taxpayer's overall income
for the year or its useful life is short,"8 3 (2) currently deductible because it is a
recurring expenditure in "roughly equivalent amounts," 84 and (3) capitalized
78 Id.
79 I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1988).80 Gunn, supra note 60, at 450.
81 See aL82 That is, whether or not the expenditure is one that is recurring and in amounts that
are not too disparate. This treatment also assumes that the expenditure is nondepreciable.
83 Lee, supra note 55, at 680.
84 Ld.
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and a useful life is approximated to allow for amortization when the cost is
neither relatively small nor recurring in nature.
A. Relatively Small Expenditures
The first case that expressly held that an expenditure was currently
deductible because it resulted in a small distortion of income and most clearly
reflected income was Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v.
United States.85 In Cincinnati Railway the taxpayer operated a railroad that was
governed by the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC").8 6 Pursuant to the
ICC's "General Instructions of Accounting Classifications," the taxpayer
followed the "minimum rule" that required currently deducting all purchases of
property that cost less than $500, except for land, tracks, and railroad cars. 87
Declaring that the sections of the Code are "inextricably intertwined," 88 the
U.S. Court of Claims treated the question as one of clear reflection of income
"and allowed a deduction for the cost of the 'minimum rule' items." 89
The reason for expensing items that do not have much of a distortive effect
when compared to overall income is not necessarily that it results in a more
accurate reflection of income.90 Rather, the reason is that "the burden on the
taxpayer of accounting for such costs through capitalization and depreciation
would not justify the small increase in the accuracy of determining taxable
income that would result from capitalization." 91 In these situations theoretical
analysis must succumb to economical practicality. 92
B. Recuring Expenditures
Recurring expenses of roughly equivalent amounts should also be currently
deductible, and until INDOPCO many recurring expenses were given just such
tax treatment.93 If viewed in isolation, an expenditure that confers significant
benefit in years to come results in a distortion of income if currently deducted.
85 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. CI. 1970); Lee, supra note 56, at 679.
86 Gndnnad Ry., 424 F.2d at 565.
87 Gunn, supra note 60, at 454.
8 8 jn this case §§ 162, 263, and 446.
89 Gun, supra note 60, at 455.
9 Old. at 457.
91 IL (citing Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pae. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572
(Ct. Cl. 1970)).
92 See Lee, supra note 56, at 683.
93 See, e.g., Treas. Regs. 1.162-4 (repairs) and 1.162-5 (certain educational expenses
relating to employment).
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However, if the taxpayer has a number of recurring expenses year after year,
the overall result will be a small distortion of income and current deductibility
will be cost effective. 94 Professor Gunn illustrates this point with an example of
a taxpayer whose business uses ten widgets at a cost of one hundred dollars
each.95 Each widget has a useful life of five years. In this situation, the
taxpayer would deduct two hundred dollars in depreciation each year. 96 This
amounts to the price of two widgets, which is the average number of widgets
that the taxpayer would place into service each year. 97 Deducting the costs of
the widgets each year as the taxpayer places them into service will thus result
in the same income figure as if they were capitalized. 98 This treatment should
be given to expenses such as repairs, employee training, and advertising99
where the expenses are "regularly recurring and . . . are not substantially
greater in one year than another ... ."100 This treatment will result in a small
distortion of income and save taxpayers the burden of accounting for these
expenditures through capitalization. 10 1
C. Business Expansion &penditures
Business expansion costs that are neither recurring in nature nor
sufficiently small in comparison to net income (such that they should not be
currently deducted) should not be capitalized indefinitely. If these expenses
were capitalized under the current system, a taxpayer would not recover its
costs until business operations ceased. Rather, a taxpayer should be permitted
to "estimate the period benefited by the expenditure, i.e., the useful life, and
amortize the expenditure as a freestanding asset over that period." 102 Before
being reversed by the Fourth Circuit en banc, this was the holding of a panel of
the Fourth Circuit concerning the business costs in NCNB Corp. v. United
94 Gunn, supra note 60, at 455.
95 The example ignores, as does the Code, the time value of money. As Professor
Gunn admits, such an assumption is unrealistic in an expanding business during an
inflationary period. Id.
96 Professor Gunn assumes straight-line depreciation on five widgets with no salvage
value. (10 x $100)/5=$200. Id. at 455 & n.53.
97 Id. at 455. Ten widgets per year, each with a useful life of five years. 10/5=2 per
year.
98 Id.
99 The Service has stated that advertising will continue to be given such treatment
despite INDOPCO. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.10 0 Lee, supra note 56, at 682.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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States.103 Even if only a rough estimate can be given as to the amortization
period, this treatment results in a smaller distortion of income than either
current deductibility or indefinite capitalization. Due to the dollar amount of
these expenses, the cost of accounting for the amortization is warranted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that despite an ensuing future
benefit, some expenses are nevertheless currently deductible.10 4 The Court was
likely referring to expenses relating to advertising and employee training,
among others. Undoubtedly, taxpayers incur some of these expenses with an
expectation of future benefits,' 0 5 and the Court was well aware of this when it
decided Lincoln Savings. The statement in Lincoln Saings regarding
deductibility of some future benefit expenses was the law then and should
remain the law even after INDOPCO. Rather than a determination based solely
on a future benefit analysis, the test should be made according to a system that
results in the smallest overall distortion of income. 106 This entails currently
deducting some expenditures that provide benefit beyond the current taxable
year.
Furthermore, the Service should be more realistic in making its tax
policies. Capitalization requirements should not be viewed without
consideration of an allowance for a depreciation deduction. If the Service is
going to require capitalization, then it should provide a system for taxpayers to
recover the costs of the expenditures that reflects income as closely as
administratively feasible. As this Comment has attempted to prove, this result
should be accomplished with a system based on a theory of distortion of
income, while recognizing administrative costs and incurring certain accounting
costs only where the decrease in distortion warrants the effort necessary to
obtain the increase in accuracy.
Brett M. Alexander
103 651 F.2d 942, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en
bane). This reversal was based on the separate and distinct asset test. Id. For a good
discussion of the case, see Lee, supra note 56, at 681-82.
104 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
105 See LoFaso, stpra note 59, at 818.
106 The determination should not necessarily be based on a system that provides the
most accurate reflection of income, but rather, one that provides a small distortion of
income after taking accounting costs and their ensuing benefits into consideration.
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